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Any general statement as to whether the secular trend of a society is eugenic or dysgenic depends 
upon a reliable calibration of the measurement of general intelligence. Richard Lynn set the mean 
IQ of the United Kingdom at 100 with a standard deviation of 15, and he calculated the mean IQs 
of other countries in relation to this “Greenwich IQ”. But because the UK test scores could be 
declining, the present paper recalibrates the mean IQ 100 to the average of seven countries 
having a historical mean IQ of 100. By comparing Lynn-Vanhanen-IQ with PISA scores and 
educational attainment of native and foreign born populations transformed into the IQ metric, we 
confirmed brain gain and brain drain in a number of nations during recent decades. Furthermore, 
the growth of gross domestic product per capita can be derived as a linear function of the 
percentage of people with an IQ above 105 and its underlying frequency of a hypothetical major 
gene of intelligence. 
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The Calibration of National IQ Means 
Most intelligence tests, such as those used by Lynn and Vanhanen (2002, 2006) in 
their compilations, have been constructed in Britain and the United States and 
have subsequently been administered to samples of the populations in other 
countries throughout the world. In order to make comparisons possible, Lynn set 
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the mean IQ of Britain at 100 with a standard deviation of 15, and he calcutaded 
the mean IQs of other countries in relation to this “Greenwich IQ”. 
As the standard of living during the phase of early industrialization deteriorated, 
the height of Saxony’s soldiers decreased within a time span of 60 years (birth 
years 1775-1835) by about 6 cm (Ewert, 2006). Analogous secular trends up and 
down have been reported for all industrialized countries. In the past century the 
acceleration of bodily growth has been accompanied by a similar secular rise of 
cognitive test scores usually called the Flynn Effect (Fernandez-Ballesteros and 
Juan-Espinosa, 2001).  
In the case of the Standard Progressive Matrices test, for example, which has been 
administered in many countries and which Lynn and Vanhanen (2002) used 
extensively for the calculation of national IQs, the British mean IQ increased at a 
rate of approximately 2 points per decade from 1938, when the test was 
constructed, up to 1979. Where this and other tests have been used, adjustments 
for the secular rise of IQ have been made by Lynn. In some cases such an 
adjustment involved a bit of guesswork, but in retrospect and comparing it with 
other data sets available now (see Tables 1 and 3), an excellent and innovative job 
has been done. These adjustments can be understood as an attempt to correct 
phenotypic values of IQ to its genotypic values.  
 
Table 1 
PISA scores (500; 100) of mathematical literacy and the respective means of differences from the 
mean of seven countries (whose Lynn-Vanhanen mean IQ is 100), these differences transformed 
into PISA IQ (100; 15) values, Lynn-Vanhanen estimates of IQ 2002 and 2006, and Rindermann 
estimates of IQ (from which 1 point is already subtracted in the lower part of the table)  
Country PISA 
2000(1) 
PISA 
2003(2) 
PISA 
2006(3) 
mean 
diff. 
PISA 
IQ 
L/V IQ 
2002(4) 
L/V IQ 
2006(5) 
Rind IQ 
2007(6) 
Belgium 520 529 520 +2 100 100 99 100-1 
Canada 533 532 527 +8 101 97 99 102-1 
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Netherlands (535)* 538 531 +15 102 102 100 102-1 
New Zealand 537 523 522 +3 100 100 99 101-1 
Sweden 510 509 502 -15 98 101 99 101-1 
Switzerland 529 527 530 +6 102 101 101 101-1 
UnitedKingdom 529 (512)* 495 -10 99 100 100 102-1 
mean of these 7 
countries  
528 524 518 1,3 100,29 100,14 99,57 101,29 
-1 
corrected mean 527 523 517  100 100  100,29 
Argentina 388  381 -138 79 96 93 88 
Australia 533 524 520 +3 100 98 98 100 
Austria 515 506 505 -14 98 102 100 100 
Brazil 334 356 370 -169 75 87 87 83 
Bulgaria 430  413 -101 85 93 93 95 
Chile 384  411 -125 81 93 90 88 
Czech Republic  498 516 510 -14 98 97 98 99 
Denmark 514 514 513 -9 99 98 98 98 
Finland 536 544 548 +20 103 97 99 102 
France 517 511 496 -14 98 98 98 99 
Germany 490 503 504 -23 97 102 99 98 
Greece 447 445 459 -73 89 92 92 96 
Hongkong 560 550 547 +30 104 107 108 105 
Hungary 488 490 491 -33 95 99 98 100 
Iceland 514 515 506 -11 98 98 101 100 
Indonesia 367 360 391 -150 78 89 87 85 
Ireland 503 503 501 -15 98 93 92 97 
Israel 433  447 -82 88 94 95 95 
Italy 457 466 462 -61 91 102 102 100 
Japan 557 534 523 +16 102 105 105 104 
Korea (South) 547 542 547 +23 103 106 106 105 
Latvia 463 483 486 -45 93 97 98 97 
Luxembourg 446 493 490 -46 93 101 100 98 
Mexico 387 385 406 -130 81 87 88 84 
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Norway 499 495 490 -27 96 98 100 99 
Poland 470 490 495 -37 94 99 99 98 
Portugal 454 466 466 -60 91 95 95 94 
Russia 478 468 476 -45 93 96 97 98 
Slovakia - 498 492 -25 96 96 96 98 
Spain 476 485 480 -42 94 97 98 97 
Thailand 432 417 417 -103 85 91 91 90 
Tunisia - 359 365 -158 76 84 83 84 
Turkey - 423 424 -97 85 90 90 87 
United States 493 493 474 -39 94 98 98 99 
Uruguay - 422 427 -96 86 96 96 91 
(xxx)* mean of the two other PISA values of this country 
- no data 
Sources: 
• (1) OECD (2003). Literacy skills for the world of tomorrow – further results from PISA 2000, p. 100. 
• (2) OECD (2004). A profile of student performance in mathematics, p. 92. 
• (3) OECD (2007a). Executive Summary. PISA 2006, p. 53. 
• (4) Lynn, R. & Vanhanen, T. (2002). IQ and the wealth of nations. Westport, CT: Praeger, p. 73ff. 
• (5) Lynn, R. & Vanhanen, T. (2006). IQ and global inequality. Augusta, GA: Washington Summit Publ., p. 
55ff. 
• (6) Rindermann, H. (2007). The g-factor of international cognitive ability comparisons: the homogeneity of 
results in PISA, TIMSS, PIRLS and IQ-tests. European Journal of Personality, 21, 667-706, here p. 700ff. 
 
 
 
In 2002, after the publication of IQ and the Wealth of Nations (Lynn and 
Vanhanen, 2002) and the preliminary reports of PISA 2000, Weiss became aware 
that PISA tests can be understood as IQ tests (Weiss, 2002; Lehrl, 2005) and that 
the transformation of PISA scores into IQ results in very similar numbers (Weiss, 
2005, 2006). PISA scores, mean 500, standard deviation 100, can easily be 
transformed into IQ values, mean 100, standard deviation 15, by adding or 
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subtracting the deviation from the mean in the relationship 15 : 100. For example., 
a PISA score of 433 corresponds to IQ 90, PISA 567 to IQ 110. 
But can a PISA score of 500 set to be an IQ of 100? The mean of 500 is the mean 
of all participating countries of the OECD, not the mean of the United Kingdom. 
In the 2003 PISA study, because of the inclusion for the first time of Turkey in the 
reference sample for calculating the mean of 500, the average of Germany and 
other countries has risen 3 (non-transformed) PISA points (corresponding to 0.45 
IQ) in comparison to 2000 without their contributing anything to such an effect.  
 
In 2000 the PISA score of the United Kingdom was 529, but in 2006 only 495. 
This would mean a PISA IQ of 104 in 2000 and 99 in 2006, but we had to set this 
104 and 99 to be the “Greenwich IQ” of 100. Perhaps the average IQ of the United 
Kingdom was or is actually declining, and it is not reasonable to calibrate the IQ 
of the world to the waterline of a single leaking ship. In order to avoid this 
possible methodological pitfall, we set the arithmetic means of the PISA scores in 
2000, 2003, and 2006 of seven countries of which the mean IQ was estimated by 
Lynn and Vanhanen (2002) to be 100, as IQ 100 (see Table 1). Overall, rises and 
declines of IQ within these seven countries seem to average out quite well. 
As shown by Rindermann (2007), combining the scores of the mathematics, 
readings and science subtests of PISA makes no essential difference from using 
the mathematical subtest alone, because all subtests of PISA are heavily loaded 
with general cognitive ability. For example, in 2006 the transformed PISA mean 
of Germany on the reading scale is IQ 98, on the science scale IQ 99, on the 
mathematical scale IQ 98. Essentially, all three scales of PISA measure general 
intelligence (Lehrl, 2005). 
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Unifying the results of international educational research (not only of PISA but 
also the analogous inclusion of TIMSS and PIRLS) and psychometric testing 
(Lynn and Vanhanen, 2006) into a plausible estimate (also the intention of 
Hanushek and Woessmann, 2007) of respective national IQs is the merit of 
Rindermann’s contribution (2007). However, he did miss the problem of 
calibration entirely. As can be seen in Table 1, the IQ values estimated by him are 
on average 1 point too high. 
In their publications, today’s educational psychologists prefer to avoid the valued-
laden terms “intelligence” and “IQ” completely (Brand, 1995; Brand, Constales 
and Kane, 2003; Weiss, 2002). Those who dislike the term IQ can feel free to 
transform all IQ values ever measured or calculated by differential psychologists 
(Lynn, 2008; Lynn and Vanhanen, 2002, 2006; Weiss, 2005; Rindermann, 2007) 
into “competencies” and “literacy” on 500;100 scale. In such a case all numerical 
relations, all correlations and all conclusions will remain the same. 
 
The Effects of Selective Migration and Differential Fertility on IQ Means 
Before the author had calculated Table 2, he was convinced as anybody else that 
because of different curricula in different countries educational attainments are 
difficult to compare across nations. However, recent data, in which the educational 
attainments of natives and migrants are reported separately, make it possible to 
estimate the effects of migration on IQ means. 
Educational attainments were transformed into IQ in the following way: The OECD average of 
native-borns with less than upper secondary education is 41%, which corresponds to a median 
percentile of 20.5 and IQ 89. The average of people with upper secondary and post-secondary 
education is 40%, which corresponds to a median percentile of 41 + 20 = 61 and IQ 104. The 
average of adult people with tertiary education is 18%, which corresponds to a median 
percentile of 41 + 40 + 9 = 91 and hence IQ 120. However, because the calibrated OECD 
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average of all OECD countries is not IQ 100 but IQ 96 (see Table 1), we have to correct IQ 89 
to IQ 85, IQ 104 to IQ 100 and IQ 120 to IQ 116. 
Now, in order to calculate the mean” educational IQ” of the native-born population of Australia 
(see Table 2), we had to multiply 46 x 85 = 3910, 15 x 100 = 1500, and 39 x 116 = 4524. By 
adding 3910 + 1500 + 4524 = 9934, divided by 100, we get a mean “educational IQ” of 99. In 
the analogous way we calculate for the foreign-born population of Australia a mean IQ of 101. 
Because the percentage of immigrants into Australia amounts to 25%, the mean educational IQ 
of its total population is 99. 
 
Table 2 
Educational attainment of the native- and foreign-born populations of OECD countries, 
percentage of immigrants, and Educational IQ (100; 15) of the total populations 
Country  Native/foreign: 
less than upper 
seconday(1) % 
- Mean IQ 85 
Native/foreign: 
tertiary(1) 
 % 
- Mean IQ 116 
Immigrants 
 (2) % 
Educational 
IQ of total 
population(3) 
Difference of 
Educ. IQ 
foreign/native 
borns(4) 
Australia 46 / 38 39 / 43 25 99 + 2 
Austria 33 / 49 11 /11 12 98 - 3 
Belgium 47 / 54 23 / 22 11 97 - 2 
Canada 32 / 30 32 / 38 18 100 + 2 
CzechRepublic 23 / 38 10 / 13 6 99 - 2 
Denmark 41 / 49 19 / 19 4 98 - 2 
Finland 40 / 53 23 / 19 3 100 - 3 
France 46 / 55 17 / 18 9 97 - 1 
Germany 24 / 44 19 / 15 7 101 - 3 
Greece 54 /45 13 / 15 1 95 + 1 
Hungary 45 / 41 11 / 20 4 96 + 1 
Ireland 48 / 30 23 / 41 11 97 + 6 
Italy 64 / 54 8 / 12 2 92 + 2 
Japan 25 / 26 27 / 30 1 102 - 2 
Luxembourg 29 / 37 13 / 22 27 97   0 
Mexico 72 / 37 11 / 38 1 90 + 11 
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Netherlands 41 / 53 19 / 18 11 98 - 2 
New Zealand 30 / 19 27 / 31 20 100 + 2 
Norway 21 / 18 23 / 31 6 102 ..0 
Poland 31 / 48 10 / 12 3 95 ..0 
Portugal 80 / 55 8 / 19 3 90 + 5 
Spain 64 / 55 19 / 22 5 94 + 1 
Sweden 25 / 30 23 / 24 12 101 - 2 
Switzerland 18 / 42 26 / 24 25 102 - 3 
Turkey 79 /49 5 / 17 2 90 + 5 
UnitedKingdom 29 / 41 20 / 35 12 99   0 
United States 22 / 40 27 / 26 7 101 - 3 
OECD average 41 / 41 18 / 23 7 96 + 2 
 
Sources: 
• (1) OECD (2007b). OECD factbook 2007. Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics. Migration – 
Education - Educational attainment of immigrants. Table: The educational attainment of the native- and 
foreign born populations as a percentage of the population aged 15 and above, within each group, circa 
2000. – The upper secondary and post-secondary educational attainment (mean IQ 100) is the difference 
between 100 and the sum of the percentages of the less than the upper secondary plus tertiary.  
• (2) Docquier, F. and A. Marfouk (2006). International migration by education attainment, 1990 - 2000. In: 
Özden, C. and M. Schiff (eds.): International Migration, Remittances and the Brain Drain (pp. 151-191). 
Washington, D. C.: The World Bank. - Table 5.6.A Net Brain Gain in OECD countries in 2000, pp. 182-
183. 
• (3) Means, calculated on the basis of source (1) and two analogous data sets: List, J. and C. Schnabel 
(2004). Bildungsstagnation bei abnehmender Erwerbsbevölkerung. Bildungspolitische Herausforderungen 
durch Geringqualifizierte. Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen 
Nürnberg, Discussion Paper No. 26. – Table 1, p. 8: Ausbildungsstand der 25- bis 64-jährigen Bevölkerung 
im internationalen Vergleich, 1992 and 2001. – The sources of List and Schnabel are OECD data (1995, 
2003) and calculations of their own. In 1992 the OECD means of the 45% with less upper secondary were 
IQ 87, of the 36% with upper secondary IQ 101, and of the 11% with tertiary education IQ 120. 
• (4) These differences are only based on source (1). 
.. 
 
The general correpondence of means of educational IQ, PISA IQ and Lynn-
Vanhanen IQ should not be a complete surprise. Rindermann (2007) had already 
found a correlation of .78 across countries between mean IQ and educational level 
of young adults, operationalized by an index composed of three measures: 1. adult 
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literacy rate 1991; 2. percentage of persons between 12 and 19 years old 1960 – 
1985 having graduated from secondary school; and 3. the mean of years of 
schooling of persons 25 years or older for 1990, 1995 and 2000. 
Generally, the differences between Lynn-Vanhanen IQ, PISA IQ and Educational 
IQ do not exceed plus or minus two points. Whereas Lynn-Vanhanen IQ is based 
on IQ tested samples (in some countries even on a single, small and local sample), 
and PISA IQ is based on large and representative samples of schoolchildren, 
Educational IQ is based on data of the total adult population. The data on 
educational attainment, scaled as Educational IQ, and PISA results confirm, in 
most cases within the limits of measurement error, the results of a century of IQ 
testing, summarized by Lynn and Vanhanen (2002, 2006). Whoever active in the 
field of educational economy had ever imagined such a possibility?  
However, not in all countries educational attainments are well calibrated to allow 
international comparisons. Obviously, the Educational IQ of the United States 
does not fit with its Lynn-Vanhanen IQ and PISA IQ. Because of the decline in the 
value of a US college education arising form increases over time in the number of 
persons graduating from college, there is a stronger deflation of educational 
degrees in the United States than in other OECD countries. Also Scandinavian 
degrees seem be more deflated than degrees in the Netherlands. 
There is a theory of college-going decision making (Arai, 1998) which is quite 
different from human capital theory (Wößmann, 2002; Hanushek and Woesmann, 
2007). This alternative theory is based on the idea that the role of higher education 
is not to certify the knowledge and skills aquired in college, but simply to convey 
information to society about the degree holder’s innate productivity. According to 
this theory, those who have high productive capabilities acquire higher education 
so that firms can identify degrees holders as more productive and pay them more. 
This role of education has been called signaling, screening, filtering or sorting by 
different authors (Arrow, 1973; Burdett, 1978; Spence, 2002). The holding of a 
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degree is also seen as a signal whether an applicant is from a rich and educated 
family or not. This information is used to guess their productivity because those 
from rich and educated families are more productive either on average or with 
certainty (Bowles and Gintis, 2002; Mulligan, 1999). Signaling (filtering) theory 
assumes that higher education does not improve students’ talents because it does 
not change their genotypes. An employer uses a job applicant’s educational degree 
or years of education, this means in our context his Educational IQ, to infer his 
position in the ability distribution. The education system of most countries 
consists of primary, secondary and tertiary education. Suppose that only primary 
education was initially compulsory and that compulsory education has been 
extended to the secondary level. Because of this change, the genotype of 
individuals who the signaling theory considers to be of low ability and who used 
to receive only primary education will now receive secondary education. Then, the 
average productivity and accordingly wages of workers with secondary education 
will be lower than before and will be deflated. This is because the extended years 
of compulsory education will neither enhance the productivity of students nor 
their IQ.  
Already in the last quarter of the 19th century in England the decrease of birth rates 
in the upper stratum led to the assumption of a threat of an accompanying decrease 
of average giftedness. But contrary to all such expectations cognitive test scores 
rose over many decades (Fernandez-Ballesteros and Juan-Espinosa, 2001). For a 
geneticist (Weiss, 1992) it seems clear that – in analogy to the already mentioned 
acceleration of body height - such a rise could only be a rise in phenotypic values 
and not in genotypic ones. However, under the impression of the Flynn effect, the 
argument that a dysgenic development was imminent seemed to be ridiculous to 
the wider public (Lynn, 1996).  
In a comparative study of national fertility surveys taken around 1970, Finland 
was the only country where a positive correlation with fertility became more 
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accentuated as husband’s education increased (Jones, 1982). In view of the 
development in other Scandinavian countries (Teasdale and Owen, 2008), it can 
be doubted that such a trend has continued up to today. 
A study (UN, 1995) which analyzed nationally representative surveys of 26 
countries (including 10 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, but also Egypt, Indonesia, 
Thailand, Brazil, Mexico and Peru) found in all countries a strong negative 
correlation between women’s years of education and their mean number of living 
children. This was confirmed by Meisenberg (2008) with data from the 1990, 1995 
and 2000 waves of World Value Survey covering 78 countries. Because this 
correlation has been observed for both industrialized and developing countries for 
more than half a century already (Lam, 1997), economists are beginning to discuss 
the possible consequences (Bishop, 1989; Goujon and Lutz, 2004). Exceptions (as 
temporarily Finland was) are very few, and the elite of managers and professionals 
with sometimes a relatively high number of surviving children, (causing a U-
shaped distribution of differential fertility in some countries) is numerically too 
small to have a trend-changing demographic effect. 
However, as it seems, within one generation or even within a few years the impact 
of dysgenic fertilily on IQ means of countries is much smaller than the impact of 
selective migration.  
 
Table 3 
OECD countries with at least 7 percent immigrants, Lynn-Vanhanen estimates of IQ (2002), 
Educational IQ, PISA IQ, difference of Educational IQ between foreign and native born and the 
percentage of immigrants among the adult population, and difference of PISA IQ between 
children with and without migrational background  
Country  L/V IQ 
2002(see Table 1) 
  
Educational 
IQ(see Table 2) 
 
PISA 
IQ(see Table 
1) 
Difference. of 
Educ. IQ 
foreign/native 
Difference of 
PISA IQ 
between 
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Mean year of 
birth about 
1955 
Mean year of 
birth about 1960 
Mean year 
of birth 
1988 
born and 
percentage of 
immigrants(see 
Table 2)
 
children with 
and without 
migrational 
background(1) 
Ireland 93 97 98 + 6 – 11% no data 
Australia 98 98 100 + 2 – 25% - 1 
Canada 97 100 101 + 2 – 18%    0 
New Zealand 100 100 100 + 2 – 20% - 2 
UnitedKingdom 100 99 99 
   0 – 12% no data 
France 98 97 98 - 1 -  9% - 8 
Belgium 100 97 100 - 2 – 11% - 15 
Netherlands 102 97 102 - 2 – 11% - 10 
Sweden 101 101 98 - 2 – 12% - 10 
Austria 102 98 98 - 3 – 12% - 9 
Germany 102 101 97 - 3 –  7% - 12 
Switzerland 101 102 102 - 3 – 25% - 11 
United States 98 101 94 - 3 -  7% - 4 
 
Source: 
• (1) Zimmermann, K. F. (2005). Herausforderungen des demografischen Wandels für den Standort 
Deuschland. Berlin: DIW, p. 16, Figure: Kinder mit Migrationshintergrund in Deutschland; 
Integrationsprobleme. Beispiel: Mathematikleistungen im PISA-Test 2002. 
 
 
On average, shoolchildren tested by PISA are born about one generation later than 
the subjects of IQ test samples summarized by Lynn and Vanhanen (2002). By 
comparing Lynn-Vanhanen IQ means with PISA IQ means, we see clearly that in 
Ireland, Australia, Canada and New Zealand where the Educational IQ of 
immigrants is higher than of natives the IQ of the total population is rising, and in 
Germany and Austria where the Educational IQ of immigrants is lower than that of 
natives, the IQ is declining. A rise of 5 IQ points in Ireland is contrasted with a 5-
points decline in Germany. Background data from many sources (List and 
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Schnabel, 2004; Abelshauser, 2008; Belot and Hatton, 2008; Brücker and Ringer, 
2008; Heinsohn, 2008; Zimmermann, 2005) corroborate that this rise and fall is a 
real one. 
7% of immigrants in Germany (see Table 3) are clearly an underestimate 
(immigrants from the former Soviet Union obtain in most cases the German 
citizenship and are not counted as foreigners in governmental statistics). Other 
sources (OECD, 2004) speak of more than 20% of schoolchildren with at least one 
foreign born parent (the microcensus of 2007 has counted 27% of such families; 
Brücker and Ringer, 2008.) In countries in which the the fertility of immigrants is 
higher than the fertility of the natives, the proportion of those with a migration 
background is predictably often far higher among school-aged children than in the 
total population. 
Taken OECD countries as a whole the mean IQ of immigrants is 2 points higher 
than of native borns (OECD, 2007b), overriding in such a way the effects of 
dysgenic fertility in many industrialized countries. The brain gain, especially of 
English-speaking countries, is contrasted with a brain drain from third-world and 
East European countries (Docquier, 2006; Docquier and Marfuk, 2006; Von der 
Oelsnitz et al. 2007; Belot and Hatton, 2008). The combination of brain drain with 
dysgenic fertility is leading to a fast decline of mean IQ, especially in South Africa 
and some countries of Latin America (Weiss, 2007; Lynn, 2008). 
Clearly, within one generation the effect of selective migration on IQ (of course, 
including the fertility of the migrants) means is in many countries much higher 
than the effect of differential fertility among the natives. The data show that 
Finland seems to be the only country in the world where eugenic fertiltiy has 
contributed to a rise in mean IQ during the last half century.  
 
The Law of the Vital Few 
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Another possibility for measuring differences between countries would be in terms 
of allele frequencies of genes underlying the IQ distribution. Until now, attempts 
to discover effects of hypothetical major genes underlying this distribution 
(arguments in favor and against such a hypothesis are reviewed in Weiss, 1992, 
2000) have been fruitless (Payton, 2006). In the present state of knowledge, this 
does neither prove nor disprove the existence or non-existence of such genes. In 
most countries, funding of such research and even the hypothesis of such genes is 
politically incorrect (Weiss, 2007). 
Francis Galton was the first to replace mere speculation on the inheritance of 
talent with statistical data (Galton, 1869). Weiss himself needed decades to see the 
parallels between the data collected by him in 1970/71 and his follow-up in 1993 
(see Weiss, 1992; 1994) and the earlier data of Galton, Terman and coworkers 
(Oden, 1968), and Brimhall (1922/23). When preparing an overhead transparency 
for a lecture, he wrote out the data in parallel (Weiss, 2000, p. 80; see Table 4) and 
was impressed. 
 
Table 4 
Highly gifted men and the percentage of their highly gifted male relatives 
(classified by occupation and achievement in the studies by Galton, Terman, Brimhall, and 
Weiss) 
 
  Galton Terman Brimhall Weiss   
  % % % % n (Weiss), mean year of birth 
Probands 100 84+ 100 97+ 
1972: 1329,  
1994: 357, 
born 1947 
Fathers 26 41 29 40 346, b. 1917 
Brothers 47 - 49 49 220, b. 1947 
Sons 60 64* - 55 77, b. 1972 
Grandfathers 14 - 9 9 681, b. 1887 
Uncles 16 - 13 14 615, b. 1917 
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Nephews 23 - - 22 76, b. 1970 
Grandsons 14 - - - - 
Greatgrandfathers 0 - - 4 1290, b. 1857 
Uncles of the parents 5 - - 5 1996, b. 1887 
Cousins 16 - 9# 18 570, b. 1942 
Greatgrandsons 7 - - - - 
Cousins of parents - - - 11 2250, b. 1917 
"+": classified by occupation; 100%, if classified by test 
"*": classified only by IQ; classification by occupation gives about 55%; n = 820. 
"#": some cousins were still too young and did not have full opportunity to become distinguished 
"-": no data 
 
Sources: 
• Galton, F. (1869). Hereditary Genius. London: Macmillan, p. 195.. 
100 famous men (n = 43) of science and the percentage of their famous male relatives.  
• Oden, M H. (1968). The fulfillment of promise: 40-year follow-up of the Terman group. 
Genetical Psychology Monographs, 77, 3-93. 
The mean IQ (transformed to 100;15) of the sample of probands was 146 (n = 724); the cut-off score IQ 
137.  
• Brimhall, D. R. (1922/23). Family resemblances among American men of science. 
The American Naturalist, 56, 504-547, 57, 74-88, 137-152, and 326-344. 
In 1915 questionnaires were filled in by 956 distinguished American men of science and their relatives.  
• Weiss, V. (1994). Mathematical giftedness and family relationship. European Journal for High Ability, 5, 
58-67.  
Highly gifted males (mean IQ 135 +/- 9) and their relatives in professions and occupational positions, 
typically associated with an IQ above 123. 
 
Who had ever imagined such a similarity to be possible? On the one hand (Galton, 
1869) we see famous scientists of past centuries and their famous relatives 
belonging to the upper stratum of society, on the other side schoolchildren of a so-
called socialist state (Weiss, 1992, 1994), selected by nation-wide mathematical 
competitions, and their relatives scattered over the whole spectrum of jobs and 
occupations. In addition, we see the Californian top performers of Terman’s 
Stanford-Binet IQ testing in 1916 (Oden, 1968), and Brimhall’s sample (1922/23) 
of famous American men of science. Such a parallel can only arise, if Galton’s and 
Brimhall’s criteria of fame, Weiss’ criterion of giftedness for mathematics, science 
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and high accomplishments in other fields, and Terman’s definition of high IQ have 
something substantial in common. Unconsciously (or perhaps better: very 
consciously), Galton, Terman, Brimhall, and Weiss must have shared the same 
intuitive understanding of a qualitative threshold beyond which we can speak of 
well-above-average cognitive ability. Any contribution to the genetics of general 
cognitive ability has to try to find an explanation for the regularity of this table. 
If all individuals within a population share the same gene, as for example all 
humans share a gene to develop four limbs, then 100 percent of relatives of all 
degrees (in Table 4) have four limbs. However, if there is a genetic polymorphism 
and one allele is very rare and its frequency in the overall population near zero, 
only homozygote carriers of such a rare allele may exhibit the very rare 
characteristic, for example, to be an albino. In this case, the frequency of albinism 
among relatives decreases very rapidly with each degree of decreasing 
consanguinity to the proband. In other words, from the slope of the decrease the 
allele frequency underlying the character can be estimated. By applying the 
method of stochastic Mendelian matrices (Geppert and Koller, 1938; Li and Sacks, 
1954) as early as 1971 Weiss (see Weiss, 1992, 2000) put forward the hypothesis 
that a major gene, M1, could explain the frequency of fame and high giftedness 
among the consanguine kin of the highly gifted. In a population with a mean IQ of 
about 100, the frequency q of this hypothetical allele M1 was estimated to be 
about 0.20. Of course, the distribution of Table 4 is predicted not only by a major 
gene hypothesis, but can also be modeled by polygenic inheritance with small 
effects of many loci. However, Occams’ razor states that the explanation of any 
phenomenon should make as few assumptions as possible.  
The hypothesis of a major gene locus of IQ was and is not based on Table 4 alone, 
but of a large body of data showing Mendelian segregation of giftedness and IQ 
within families (Weiss, 1992, 1994), from which the conclusion was drawn that 
individuals with a genotypical IQ above 123 are homozygote M1M1, and those 
 17 
above 104 are heterozygote M1M2 (where M2 stands for an unknown series of 
alleles). As an addition, the hypothetical gene frequency of M1 was inferred from 
Table 4. 
According to Jensen (1980, p. 115.): “The socially and personally most important 
threshhold regions on the IQ scale are those that differentiate with high probability 
between persons who because of their level of general mental ability ... can or 
cannot succeed in the academic or college preparatory curriculum through high 
school (about 105).” Independently, an author who is publishing on the world 
wide web under the pseudonym “La Griffe du Lion” [The Paw of the Lion] put 
forward his “smart fraction theory” (2004), stating: “In market economies, per 
capita GDP is directly proportional to the population fraction with IQ greater than 
105. …According to the 1992 Wonderlic Personnel Test and Scholastic Level 
Exam Users Manual, at an IQ level of 106 we might expect to find bookkeepers, 
credit clerks, laboratory technicians, salesmen and secretaries. At slightly higher 
IQs we find registered nurses, sales account executives, administrative assistants 
and store managers. These people are not rocket scientists. They are, however, 
vital to a flourishing economy. Any nation … needs a cognitive core to carry its 
water.” While Lynn and Vanhanen (2002) found a nonlinear relationship between 
GDP and IQ, La Griffe du Lion asserts that per capita GDP is related linearly to 
the percentage of “smart fraction”, but his figures are not fully convincing. 
However, we can go a step further and extend his argument.  
From the Hardy-Weinberg-law of population genetics follows that the frequency q 
of the hypothetical major gene M1 is (1-q)2 + 2q(1-q) + q2 = 1. From q = 0.20 
follows that 2q(1-q) + q2 = 0.36. This frequency of 0.36 and its percentile rank not 
only corresponds to an IQ of 105 (in a population with a mean IQ of 100), but is 
also identical with the smart fraction suggested by La Griffe du Lion. By 
extracting the root from the non-smart fraction (1-q)2, we get the allele frequency 
q of M1 (see Table 5) in different countries. 
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Table 5 
Mean of Rindermann estimates of IQ (minus 1) and PISA IQ, smart fraction of the population 
(percentage above IQ 105.6), allele frequency of the hypothetical major gene M1 underlying IQ, 
0.93 theoretical GDP per capita (1998), and 0.57 real GDP per capita (2007)  
Country mean of 
Rind IQ (-1) 
(1)
 and PISA 
IQ(see Table 1) 
Smart 
fraction(2) 
% 
gene 
frequency 
M1(3) 
0.93 x 
theoretical GDP 
(1998) per cap 
$(2) 
0.57 x real 
GDP (2007) 
per cap $(4) 
Finland 103 43 0.24 24100 20200 
Netherlands 102 41 0.23 22600 22000 
Canada 101 38 0.21 21200 21800 
Switzerland 101 38 0.21 21200 22700 
UnitedKingdom 100 36 0.20 19800 20100 
New Zealand 100 36 0.20 19800 15600 
Australia 100 36 0.20 19800 21400 
Belgium 100 36 0.20 19800 20800 
Sweden 99 33 0.18 18400 21000 
Austria 99 33 0.18 18400 22200 
France 99 33 0.18 18400 19300 
Denmark 99 33 0.18 18400 21300 
Germany 98 31 0.18 17100 19600 
Ireland 98 31 0.18 17100 26000 
United States 97 28 0.15 15800 26200 
Italy 96 26 0.14 14600 17700 
Spain 96 26 0.14 14600 19200 
Greece 93 20 0.11 11200 17400 
Portugal 93 20 0.11 11200 12400 
Israel 92 18 0.09 10200 16400 
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Uruguay 89 13 0.07 7500 6100 
Thailand 88 12 0.06 6800 4600 
Turkey 86 10 0.05 5400 5400 
Chile 85 9 0.05 4700 8200 
Argentina 84 8 0.04 4200 7400 
Mexico 83 7 0.03 3700 7100 
Indonesia 82 6 0.03 3300 1900 
Tunisia 80 4 0.02 2400 4300 
Brazil 79 4 0.02 2100 5500 
 
Sources: 
• (1) Rindermann, H. (2007). The g-factor of international cognitive ability comparisons: the homogeneity of 
results in PISA, TIMSS, PIRLS and IQ-tests. European Journal of Personality, 21, 667-706, here p. 700ff. 
• (2) La Griffe du Lion (2004). Smart fraction theory II. Vol. 6, No. 2, p. 11ff.; 
http://www.lagriffedulion.f2s.com/sft2.htm , retrieved on 2005-05-07. 
• (3) Weiss, V. (1992). Major genes of general intelligence. Personality and individual Differences, 13, 
1115-1134.  – Weiss, V. (1995). The advent of a molecular genetics of general intelligence. Intelligence, 
20, 115-124.  
• CIA (2008). The world factbook. Washington, D. C.: Potomac, retrieved on 2008-24-01. 
 
 
Applying a rule of thumb, we see that this frequency multiplied by about 1000 
gives the theoretical GDP in 1998 (La Griffe du Lion, 2004). Now, indeed, the 
relationship between GDP and the frequency of a major gene underlying above-
average IQ is a linear one. Also Docquier (2006) found a linear correlation of .68 
between GDP per capita (average 1995-2005) and the proportion of worker with 
tertiary education in the labor force. This proportion is not identical with the smart 
fraction, but about the half of it. 
The Pareto principle (also known as the 80-20 rule), the law of the vital few, states 
that for many events 80% of the effects come from 20% of the causes (Koch, 
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2000). The power of a nation does not depend of its mere number, but of the 
percentage of its cognitive elite, optimized by social evolution (Weiss, 2000). 
Highly intelligent people are networking, and the economic effect of networking is 
the square of the nodes of the network, i.e. in our case the square of the number of 
people involved (Koch, 2000). Korotayev, Malkov & Khaltourina (2006) found 
out that the dynamics of hyperbolic growth of world GDP can be described by a 
simple equation containing one quadratic term. We see no other solution than for 
this term to be identical with q2, where the root of q2  predicts for a population the 
percentage of highly gifted with an IQ above 123.  
Advanced methods, applied very successfully in the low IQ range, for example, homozygosity 
mapping and comparative genomic hybridization within consangineous families (Knight et al., 
2008), have still never been used in order to detect high IQ genes. Of course, the IQ is influenced 
by hundred of minor genes and other effects, measurable under certain circumstances and in 
subpopulations, but this does not exclude the possibility of major gene effects. 
A rationale for the search of such genes should include the following knowledge and steps: 1. 
homozygosity mapping among the relatives of highly gifted, who have an IQ above 123 (for them 
their Educational IQ could be a good estimate); 2. nonsynomously coding SNPs and other 
genetic polymorphisms which are found to be homozygous among relatives should be checked 
whether their distribution of allele frequencies in the data bases does fit the expected racial 
distribution: about 0.20 of the rare allele among Eurasian populations and approximating 0.00 
in Subsaharan Africa; 3. after 1 and 2. are given, the possible association between genotypus 
and IQ should be investigated in a larger sample. 
Indeed, among hundredthousands of SNPs already investigated there are very, very few which fit 
the second criterium, for example: rs1186902 of the neurotransmitter gene GABRR1, which 
exhibits a wide range of mRNA expression (Khaitovich et al., 2008); similar rs4667001 of the 
gene ZNF804A, the only gene to be confirmed associated with schizophrenia in a genome wide 
association study (O’Donovan et al., 2008). - Because a SNP of the gene NQO2 fulfilled the 
condition of step 2, the investigation suggested by V. Weiss in January 2006 led to the discovery 
of a minor gene of IQ (Payton et. al., 2008). 
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In 1998, the GDP per capita of a country with a hypothetical gene frequency of 
0.20 for M1 was about nine-fold higher than for a country with a frequency of 
0.02; the absolute difference in GDP per capita was about $19.000. Perhaps in 
2030 or 2040 the GDP all over the world will be four times higher than in 1998. In 
this case the per capita difference between countries with gene frequencies of 0.20 
and 0.02 will be about $70.000. This widening of the gap between highly 
industrialized and underdeveloped countries has been taking place since the 
beginning of the industrial revolution (Clark, 2007; Galor and Moav, 2002). 
The expected decline in the world’s average genotypical IQ from 95 in 1950 to 87 
in 2050 (Weiss, 2007; similar Lynn and Harvey, 2008) would mean a decrease of 
the hypothetical gene frequency q of Ml from 0.12 to 0.05 and a decrease of the 
smart fraction (with an IQ above 105) from 22% to about 10%; that means a 
decrease of about 4% per generation of the latter. 
It is common knowledge that non-market economies have lower growth rates of 
per-capita GDP than the market economies. While some former non-market 
countries with a high average IQ such as Estonia, the Czech Republic, Slovenia 
and especially China are narrowing the gap, those with a low average IQ seem to 
have no chance to catch up. But even among market economies we haveat one 
extreme the impressive success story of Singapore (Lee, 2000) and on the other 
extreme countries such as Haiti and Zimbabwe which are not only backward, but 
suffer from mismanagement and brain drain. In 1968, the Pacific island of Nauru 
possessed the highest GDP per capita in the world (cited from Wikipedia, 2008) 
due to its rich phosphate deposits. Today, after the exhaustion of these deposits, 
Nauru - faced with chaos amid political strife and the collapse of the economy 
caused by mismanagement and corruption - has a GDP more in accordance with 
the gene frequency of M1 in its population. One of the criteria which differentiate 
science from speculation is the power of prediction. In 2007, oil-producing 
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Equatorial Guinea, a country with an average IQ of 59 (Lynn and Vanhanen, 
2002), one of the lowest in the world, had a GDP per capita of $44,100 (CIA, 
2008), one of the highest in the world. We predict that, after the exhaustion of the 
oil, the GDP of this country will fall back into a range typical for a country with a 
hypothetical gene frequency of M1 below 0.02. As long as the oil is flowing, a 
number of specialists and dealers of Lebanese, Chinese, Indian and other origins 
make money, but they will abandon such a country after the boom. 
In Table 5 we included only countries with a long history of market economy and 
with at least two sets of data from PISA studies. Therefore, the overall impression 
of this table is misleading, because three quarters of world population have a GDP 
per capita below Brazil. In 2007, in Subsaharan Africa there are 12 countries with 
a GDP below $1000, all with a hypothetical gene frequency of M1 below 0.02. 
Until now, there seems to be no Flynn Effect of importance in these countries. 
Therefore, a truncation of national IQs to a minimum of 80 would make sense, but 
would not make much difference in terms of gene frequencies. 
Some countries (for example, Brazil, Israel, South Africa) with a socially and 
regionally segregated or highly stratified population (and a high Gini-index) have 
a much higher GDP than can be expected from their average IQ. In such countries, 
the variance of IQ of the overall population is higher than 15, and we should strive 
to replace the theoretical frequency of M1 by its real frequency. Most suitable 
would be measuring the percentage of subjects with an IQ above 105 directly, 
another possibility calculating the smart fraction not from the idealized bell curve 
with variance 15, but from the measured variance. So far, we do not have 
sufficient data to make such an improvement.  
Even within developed nations the difference between prosperous and more 
backward regions amounts to 10 and more IQ points. For example, in Germany the 
IQ average of Bavaria is about 10 points higher than that of Bremen (Ebenrett, 
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Hansen and Puzicha, 2003); in Italy the difference between Venice and Sicily is 13 
points; in Spain the difference between Aragon and Andalusia 8 points (OECD, 
2007a); and in the United States the difference between New Hampshire and 
Mississipi is 10 points. Such differences, aggravated by internal migration 
between the economic core and the backward regions (Ebenrett, Hansen and 
Puzicha, 2003) - but not always of such magnitude - will be found in any country. 
However, the average IQ of 102 for Italy (Lynn and Vanhanen, 2002) as a whole 
was never correct and can have been obtained only from testing in that country’s 
northern regions. 
When merging the 16 German states into one league table with the other 28 OECD 
countries that report PISA 2003 performance data, Bavaria (IQ 102) takes 5th place 
internationally, while the largest state of Germany, North Rhine-Westphalia (IQ 
94) takes 35th place and the city state of Bremen 39th place (IQ 92) out of the 44 
countries and states (Wößmann, 2007). 
There should be doubt whether the average IQ of China is really as high as 
105 (Lynn and Vanhanen, 2006) or even 106 (Rindermann, 2007; minus 1 already 
subtracted). This average may hold for the coastal regions, but perhaps not for the 
provinces in the interior (neighboring Kyrgyzystan, for example, has in 2006 a 
PISA IQ of only 69). In view of the fact that also within industrialized countries 
(see further below) the difference between the prosperous and the economically 
backward regions amounts to about 10 IQ points, why should the situation in 
China be different? Also, for decades in China, as in most countries all over the 
world, highly qualified women bear only half the number of children as 
unqualified women: those with primary education 2.14 children, and those with 
tertiary education 1.08 (Goujon and Lutz, 2004). It is simply naiveté to believe a 
one-child-policy has changed anything in this respect. 
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Within Brazil, the federal states of the South have an average IQ and GDP per 
capita similar to South Europe and four times higher than the states in the north-
east of Brazil (CIA, 2007). For such differences to arise, natural selection - from 
the Stone Age up to the present (Lynn, 1996) - is not the only and most likely 
explanation (Weiss, 1991). Political turmoil and ethnic cleansing can eliminate or 
drive away the gifted of a country, and within a very short time harm the economy 
for decades to come (Weiss, 2000). Highly-skilled citizens from stagnating 
economies are unlikely to merely watch their standard of living decline, and they 
will vote with their feet. Their migration amplifies economic divergences within 
and between countries. Since January 2007, as Romania was admitted to the 
European Union, about 1 million of former inhabitants of Romania (among them 
many gypsies) emigrated to Italy and Spain. Within the last four years more than 
800,000 East Europeans got a work permit in the United Kingdom, and alone 
within the last two years 1.5 million emigrated from Poland (Sinn, 2008). Up to 
now there are no statistical data availabe to account for the effects of this most 
recent migration on the IQ means of the respective countries. 
There are three types of men (Weiss and Weiss, 2003): Men (with IQ above 123), 
who invent machines, men (with IQ above 104), who repair machines, and men, 
who use machines. In a country where there are not enough men to construct and 
to repair a bridge, sooner or later traffic by railroad will break down (Malloy, 
2008). Now, for example, Angola needs Chinese engineers to repair railroads and 
bridges. 
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